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COMMENTS
Federal Regulation of Union Political
Expenditures: New Wine in Old Bottles
Neither do men put new wine into old bottles: else the bottles
break and the wine runneth out, and the bottles perish: but they
put new wine into new bottles, and both are preserved.
Matthew 9:17

I.

INTRODUCTION

Speaking for the American Federation of Labor in 1952, William Green fervently articulated the attitude that has inspired
union~sts to intense political involvement in the twentieth century:

Elect our friends! Defeat our enemies! That slogan contains no
element of hesitation-no hint of neutrality. It sounds a call to
action. Vigorous and aggressive political action is the only way
to carry out its dictates. 1

Encouraged by this enthusiastic political philosophy, American
labor unions have amassed a political potential that incumbents
and challengers nervously but eagerly court. 2 Unions have developed in a relatively short period of time a well..;oiled and computerized machine that has accurately been termed "one of the
most powerful political forces in the country, " 3 and which has
consistently been able to apply millions of dollars and hundreds
of thousands of man-hours to the task of defeating enemies and
electing friends. 4 Due in large measure to the momentum and
1. Green, We Are Not Neutral, AM. FEDERATIONIST, July 1952, at 3. In May of 1962,
George Meany reemphasized the importance of labor's role in politics as he remarked to
a conference of the Committee on Political Education (COPE) that "labor's most important activity" at that time was political involvement. AFL-CIO News, May 5, 1962, at 1,
col. 2.
2. It has been estimated that as of 1954, American labor boasted a political potential
consisting of 16 million workers plus their spouses and families. Hudson & Rosen, Union
Political Action: The Member Speaks, 7 INDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 404 (1954). More recently, the New Republic Magazine has suggested that "[e]ach campaign is eager to
demonstrate its labor support, and most need the assistance that union backing normally
brings . . . . "Bode, Six Million Workers Minus George Meany, NEw REPUBLIC, Jan. 31,
1976, at 7.
3. Labor's Best-Heeled Powerhouse, TIME, Mar. 1, 1976, at 10.
4. The success of labor's political involvement is generally credited to the efforts of
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speed that have accompanied organized labor's dizzy rise to political power, a heated and longstanding debate between those who
feel that "labor has no proper concern with a political question
not directly and immediately related to wages, hours, and working conditions" and those who hold that "there is no political
question which will not, in the end, have such an effect" has
pervaded the political arena. 5
Motivated partly by the scope of labor's political influence
and partly by the intensity of the arguments regarding the propriety of that influence, Congress initiated legislation early in the
1940's to limit the use of labor money for political purposes. 6
Section 441 b of the United States Code, Title 2, enacted in 1976,
represents the most recent expression of that legislative effort. 7
From its beginning, the federal response to union political involvement engendered almost as much controversy as the problem it was intended to alleviate. Through judicial interpretation,
union loophole exploitation, and legislative repair, the law governing labor political spending evolved into a regulatory scheme
of questionable validity and uncertain scope.
A detailed examination of the development of restrictions
upon union political involvement provides a clearer understanding of the conflicts and tensions which pervade that realm of
political activity as well as the available alternatives for solving
the problems associated with labor campaign spending.
the AFL-CIO's Committee on Political Education (COPE). The effectiveness of political
involvement committees was initially demonstrated in 1936 by Labor's Nonpartisan
League, which coordinated union campaigning and contributions to elect Franklin Roosevelt. The increased political needs of the 1940's inspired the CIO's Political Action
Committee (PAC) and the AFL's Labor League for Political Education (LLPE). With the
merger of the AFL and the CIO in 1955, the political machinery of PAC and LLPE was
consolidated in the form of COPE. (For a detailed description of COPE's organization and
function, see C. REHMus & D. McLAuGHLIN, LABoR AND AMERICAN POLITICS 207 (1967)).
Since 1955, COPE has flourished into labor's powerful and persuasive political and public
relations tool. One writer predicted that COPE, under the leadership of Alexander Barkan, would "wield a tremendous influence in [the 1976] election," by "pour[ing] not
only money but armies of workers into the campaign, mount[ing] mass mailing, and
mobiliz[ing] one of the most powerful political forces in the country." Labor's BestHeeled Powerhouse, TIME, Mar. 1, 1976, at 10.
5. See Zoli, Labor in Politics, 27 LAw & CoNTEMP. PaoB. 234, 234-35 (1962).
6. See Chang, Labor Political Action and the Taft-Hartley Act, 33 NEB. L. REv. 554,
560-61 & n.35 (1954).
7. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b (1976).
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REGULATION OF UNION POLITICAL ACTIVITY: AN HISTORICAL
OvERVIEW

A.

Legislative Evolution

Section 441b exhibits a long and active history. Its first legislative progenitor appeared on January 26, 1907, as a curb upon
corporate political influence. Congress had become keenly aware
of both the unusually powerful financial influence that corporations exercised upon national and state elections and the apparently unlimited discretion with which they dispensed shareholders' money for political purposes. 8
In an attempt to more completely purify the electoral process
and defend "the public interest in free elections," 9 federal lawmakers enacted a strict prohibition forbidding corporations from
making money contributions in connection with federal elections. 10 The judiciary apparently took no notice of the statute for
almost a decade. In 1916, however, a federal district court in
Pennsylvania explicitly recognized the enactment as being constitutional.11 A short time later, the United States Supreme
Court, although not directly concerned with the 1907 Act,
inadvertently infused a serious element of doubt into parts of the
existing law. In Newberry v. United States, 12 the Court, among
other things, clearly invalidated federal regulation of Senate primary elections. As a consequence, Congress was forced to consider ~ comprehensive revision of its earlier limitation on corporate political spending. The result, the Federal Corrupt Practices
Act of 1925, 13 not only eliminated the Newberry problem by defining primary elections as outside the scope of the Act, but also
strengthened the prohibitions in the 1907 statute. 14
While corporate political fervor was being dampened by Congress, American labor was just beginning to flex its political muscles. By the late 1930's, unions began to blossom into major power
8. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 113 (1948).
9. United States v. Pipefitters Local 562, 434 F.2d 1116, 1119 (8th Cir. 1970).
10. Act of Jan. 26, 1907, 34 Stat. 864-65 (1907).
11. United States v. United States Brewers' Ass'n, 239 F. 163 (W.D. Pa. 1916).
12. 256 u.s. 232 (1921).
13. Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, tit. ill, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925).
14. The Supreme Court explained the effect of the statute in the following words:
"[The Act of 1925] strengthened the 1907 statute (1) by ch~nging the phrase "money
contribution" to "contribution" . . . ; (2) by extending the prohibition on corporate contributions . . . ; and (3) by penalizing the recipient of any forbidden contribution as well as
the contributor." United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 577 (1957).
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blocs. 15 During the 1936 election, labor political influence was felt
in favor of Democratic candidates to the tune of $770,000. 16 This
development quickly aroused the attention of Congress, which
sought to extend the limitations imposed by the Act of 1925 to
labor unions by restraining "all organizations . . . whose aims or
purposes are the furtherance of group, class, or special
interests. " 17 In 1940, the Hatch Act accomplished this result in
part by explicitly restricting political contributions by organizations, including labor unions, to a maximum of $5,000.1 8 It was
soon obvious, however, that this limitation provided no serious
obstacle to labor's support of chosen candidates. In the 1940 election, instead of making large national contributions, union leadership sidestepped the legislation by making extensive smaller
donations, each within the $5,000 limit, through its numerous
local organizations. 19
With the advent of World War II, the power of organized
labor became apparent to a degree unprecedented in American
history. As the nation mobilized its industrial energy to the full
extent of its resources, the threat of paralyzing strikes emphasized the position of leverage that labor had gained to those both
within and without its ranks. When the United Mine Workers
closed down the coal industry in the early part of 1943, the danger
to the nation's war effort motivated Congress to enact the War
Labor Disputes Act (WLDA). 20 This legislation not only answered
the immediate emergency by preventing crippling wartime
strikes, but it went one step further and applied the broad prohibitions outlined in the Act of 1925 against corporate political
spending to labor organizations for the duration of the war. 21 Jus15. Comment, Political Contributions by Labor Unions, 40 TEx. L. REv. 665, 666
(1962) [hereinafter cited as Political Contributions by Labor Unions].
16. Kallenbach, The Taft-Hartley_ Act and Union Political Contributions and
Expenditures, 33 MINN. L. REv. 1, 2 & n.3 (1948).
17. S. REP. No. 151, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 127, 135 (1937).
18. Act of July 19, 1940, ch. 640, § 13, 54 Stat. 767, 770 (1940).
19. Kallenbach, supra note 16, at 4.
20. War Labor Disputes Act of 1943, 57 Stat. 163 (1943).
21. The Supreme Court noted the following reasons for extending the provisions of
the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 to labor organizations:
[The] legislative history [of the WLDA] indicates congressional belief that
labor unions should then be put under the same restraints as had been imposed
upon corporations. It was felt that the influence which labor unions exercised
over elections through monetary expenditures should be minimized, and that it
was unfair to individual union members to permit the union leadership to make
contributions from general union funds to a political party which the individual
member might oppose.
United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 115 (1948)(footnotes omitted). See also note 81 infra.
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tice Rutledge, later reviewing the extension of these restrictions
to union political spending, outlined the three objectives that
Congress sought to further by its action:
[T]he sponsors and proponents had in mind three principal
objectives.
These were: (1) To reduce what had come to be regarded
in the light of recent experience as the undue and disproportionate influence of labor unions upon federal elections; (2) to
preserve the purity of such elections and of official conduct
ensuing from the choices made in them against the use of aggregated wealth by union . . . entities; and (3) to protect union
members holding political views contrary to those supported by
the union from use of funds contributed by them to promote
acceptance of those opposing views. Shortly, these objects may
be designated as the "undue influence," "purity of elections,"
and "minority protection" objectives. 22

American labor was not alone in its disapproval of this new
restriction. President Roosevelt immediately vetoed the legislation, citing as among its most objectionable features the provision
that barred labor political contributions. 23 Congress would not be
denied, however, and the veto was overridden. As long as the war
continued, union political activity appeared significantly inhibited.
Soon after the war, Congress discovered that appearances
had been drastically misleading. In spite of the confines imposed
on labor by the WLDA, rumors circulated concerning enormous
union political spending during the 1944 campaigns. Apprehension and suspicion became so intense that Congress organized a
special committee to investigate the allegations. The search concentrated on special political organizations such as the CIO's
Political Action Committee (PAC). The investigation quickly discovered that unions had, in fact, spent more money in 1944 than
in any previous election, 24 but it reluctantly concluded that
inasmuch as unions had limited their campaign support to
"expenditures" of money for political advertising as opposed to
"contributions," there was no clear-cut violation of the 1943 pro22. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 134-35 (1948)(Rutledge, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
23. Kallenbach, supra note 16, at 5.
24. Comment, Regulation of Labor's Political Contributions and Expenditures: The
British and American Experience, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 371, 374 (1952) [hereinafter cited
as British and American Experience].
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hibitions. 25 Many lawmakers who had assisted in passing the
WLDA understandably expressed grave concern over the amount
of money that labor had expended in the previous election and
the ease with which it had bypassed the statutory limitations.
The House Special Committee to Investigate Campaign Expenditures, in its 1945 Report, soberly observed:
The scale of operation of some of these organizations is
impressive. Without exception, they operate on a Nation-wide
basis; and many of them have affiliated local organizations. One
was found to have an annual budget for "educational" work
approximating $1,500,000, and among other things regularly
supplies over 500 radio stations with "briefs for broadcasters."
Another, with an annual budget of over $300,000 for political
"education," has distributed some 80,000,000 pieces of literature, including a quarter million copies of one article. Another,
representing an organized labor membership of 5,000,000, has
raised $700,000 for its national organizations in union contributions for political "education" in a few months, and a great deal
more has been raised for the same purpose and expended by its
local organizations. 28

With the discovery of the extent of labor's financial investment
in the political arena, a serious sentiment began to develop in
various quarters encouraging sricter regulation of labor campaign
expenditures.
Labor involvement in the 1944 presidential election and the
1946 senatorial campaigns was fresh in everyone's memory as
Congress began to consider a comprehensive package of labor
legislation in 1947. The Taft-Hartley Act27 emerged from the debates of that year with a clear indication that Congress was determined to plug the loopholes in the previous law curtailing union
political spending. Section 304 of that Act28 effectuated this congressional disapproval of the extravagant use of union money
25. S. REP. No. 101, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1945).
26. H.R. REP. No. 2093, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 3 (1945).
27. 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
28. The section was codified in 18 U.S.C. § 610, where it remained until1976, when
it was repealed and replaced by 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b. As originally enacted in section 304 of
the Taft-Hartley Act, the statute stated:
It is unlawful for any . . . labor organization to make a contribution or
expenditure in connection with any election at which Presidential and Vice
Presidential electors or a Senator or Representative in . . . Congress are to be
voted for, or in connection with any primary election or political convention or
caucus held to select candidates for any of the foregoing offices . . . .
61 Stat. 136, 159 (1947).
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during political campaigns by (1) forbidding "expenditures" in
addition to "contributions;" (2) making permanent the application to labor organizations of the 1925 restrictions upon political
activity; and (3) extending its coverage to federal primaries and
nominating conventions. 29 As President Roosevelt had previously
done with the WLDA, President Truman quickly vetoed the TaftHartley Act, noting as particularly offensive the ban against
union political expenditures. Again, however, the legislation became law without the President's approval as Congress committed itself to control labor money in politics on a more rigorous and
comprehensive scale. 30

B. Judicial Whittling
American labor unions quickly demonstrated their dissatisfaction with section 304. After carefully considering the most
effective way to voice their displeasure, and upon the advice of
counsel, labor decided to initiate calculated violations of the statute, thereby inviting the courts to scrutinize its prohibitions. 31
The first meaningful opportunity to challenge the statute arose
in United States v. C/0 32 as a result of union activities during a
special Maryland election for a representative to Congress. With
the express purpose of violating the law, 33 Phillip Murray, President of the CIO published an editorial in the CIO news (a union
periodical) supporting one of the candidates. The project was
financed out of general union funds, and the periodical was distributed not only to union members but also to the general public
to the extent of about 1,000 copies. The trial court squarely con29. United States v.·UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 582-83 (1957).
30. Kallenbach, supra note 16, at 9 & n.31.
31. Comment, Union Political Expenditures Under Taft-Hartley Section 304, 48 Nw.
U.L. REv. R 64, 68 (1953). The article makes mention of a New York Times' report which
indicated that approximately 75 lawyers from around the country gathered under the
direction of the AFL to decide how to respond to the new restrictions. It was there decided
that all unions should affirmatively violate the statute. Id. at 68 n.22.
32. 77 F. Supp. 355 (D.D.C.), aff'd on other grounds, 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
33. See Raub, Legality of Union Political Expenditures, 34 S. CALIF. L. REv. 152, 15657 (1961); Comment, An Attempt to Restrict Union and Corporate Political Activity, 46
MARQ. L. REv. 364, 367 (1962-3) [hereinafter cited as An Attempt to Restrict].
Counsel for CIO not only failed to argue, both at trial and upon appeal, that the
actions of the union were not a violation of the Act but actually admitted that the statute
covered the circumstances and that the only question for adjudication was the constitutionality of the law. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 128~29 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); Rauh, supra at 156. The facts surrounding publication of the editorial seem
to indicate that efforts were made to insure that the action would be viewed as an expenditure.
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fronted the issue presented by the case and declared the restrictions on union spending unconstitutional as an abridgement of
first amendment freedoms. 34 On appeal, even though no argument had been made as to the applicability of the statute and in
spite of the fact that the constitutional question had been clearly
accentuated for consideration, 35 the Supreme Court purposely
skirted the issues as framed and held that section 304 did not
apply to the facts of the case. The Court defended its holding by
reasoning that a union periodical, published with union funds,
that advocated the election of a candidate for federal office could
not be considered an unlawful "expenditure" if it was distributed
"in regular course to those accustomed to receive copies." 36 To
hold otherwise, the Court added, would raise serious doubts as to
the statute's constitutionality. This decision was surprising not
only because the constitutional question had been so carefully
prepared for review, but, more importantly, because it flew in the
face of congressional intent and the plain meaning of the statute.37 By judicial definition, a union periodical, published in
"regular course," could now be distributed, to some extent at
least, to the general public in addition to the union membership
and still fall outside the scope of the prohibition. The decision not
only narrowed the statute's practical applicability but also revealed that certain Justices entertained "gravest doubts" as to its
constitutionality. 38
A year after the CIO decision, the courts were afforded a
second opportunity to consider the propriety of union political
spending. In United States v. Painters Local481, 39 a Connecticut
34. 77 F. Supp. 355, 359 (D.D.C.), aff'd on other grounds, 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
35. So anxious were the parties for a constitutional adjudication that Justice Frankfurter suggested that the manner in which the question was presented appeared almost
collusive: "[T]he manner by which the constitutional issue had been brought to the
Supreme Court for decision bordered on collusion. Government counsel, he maintained,
had failed in the lower court proceedings to advance 'the most effective and the least
misapprehending grounds for supporting what Congress had enacted . . . .'"Kallenbach,
supra note 16, at 15. See 335 U.S. at 126-27 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
36. 335 U.S. at 123.
37. !d. at 138-40 (Rutledge, J ., concurring); Kallenbach, supra note 16, at 17 -18;
Comment, Unions in the Political Arena: Legislative Attempts to Control Union Participatior:t in Politics, 23 Sw. L.J. 713,716-17 (1969); British and American Experience, supra
note 24, at 376-77 & n.44; Note, Interpretation of Statutes to Avoid Constitutional Questions Re Labor Union Political Contributions, 22 Mo. L. REv. 348, 354 (1962); see Note,
Section 304 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 After the Decision In The
United States us. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 1949 Wis. L. REv. 184, 191 (1949).
38. 335 U.S. at 121. See also Note, Statutory Interpretation Under LaborManagement Relations Act-Prohibition of Union Political Expenditures, 47 MicH. L.
REv. 408, 410 (1949).
39. 172 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1949).
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union authorized the purchase of advertising space in a newspaper of general circulation and radio broadcast time in order to
advocate the defeat of Senator Taft, a cosponsor of the legislation
under which the union was prosecuted. The expenditures for both
items totaled just under $145. As in CIO, there was no argument
at trial that the statute was inapplicable, 40 only that it was unconstitutional. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, however, following the Supreme Court's cue, avoided the
constitutional question altogether and held that the present case
was beyond the reach of the statute. The court noted:
In the decision in [ CJO] . . . a majority of the Supreme Court
held that a publication in a union newspaper which was distributed to members and a few other persons, did not fall within the
prohibition of the statute. While . . . the publication was by the
union itself and reached a somewhat limited class of readers,
[the Court] nowhere said that a publication in an ordinary
newspaper paid for out of the funds of a union would not also
be outside of the coverage of the Act . . . . It seems impossible,
on principle, to differentiate the scope of that decision from the
case we have before us. It is hard to imagine that a greater
number of people would be affected by the advertisement and
broadcasting in the present case than by publication in the
union periodical . . . . In a practical sense the situations are
very similar, for in the case at bar this small union owned no
newspaper and a publication in the daily press or by radio was
as natural a way of communicating its views to its members as
by a newspaper of its own. 41

In an effort to further justify its decision, the court pointed to the
"trifling 'expenditures"' that inspired the prosecution and implied that their de minimis nature might also prevent application
of the statute. 42 If the Supreme Court in CIO could be said to have
ignored the legislative history in construing the prohibition, the
Second Circuit affirmatively offended it. 43
Painters Local 481 carved out a substantial exception to the
limitations upon union political expenditures by exempting from
the operation of the statute not only union-owned periodicals,
but, at least in the case of small local unions, general newspaper
40. An Attempt to Restrict, supra note 33, at 367.
41. 172 F.2d at 856.
42. See Ruark, Labor's Political Spending and Free Speech, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 61,7576 (1958).
43. As one writer pointed out, "Senator Pepper stated on the floor that the act
applied to expenditures of 'a dollar, or 50 cents, or $500, or $1000."' ld. at 75.
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advertisements and radio broadcasts as well. In addition, it cast
further doubt upon the constitutionality of the statute which
could only be resolved if, and when, section 304 was held applicable in a particular case.
The next opportunity for the courts to examine union political spending followed closely behind Painters Local 481. In
United States v. Construction & General Laborers Local 264, 44 a
Mississippi federal district court was confronted with a fact situation that appeared to be significantly different from the earlier
cases. The alleged expenditures in Laborers· Local 264 had been
authorized by the president of a local union to further his personal campaign for Congress. The facts indicated that the money
had been spent in the form of salaries for a union business agent
and three other union employees. While the business agent devoted most of his time to conducting the campaign, the three
employees worked part time electioneering for the defendant and
part time in so-called "nonpartisan" activities such as get-outthe-vote drives and voter registration programs. 45 Ignoring the
substantial factual variations, the court faithfully mimicked the
earlier cases and avoided the constitutional question. The author
of the majority opinion, relying first upon CIO and then upon
Painters Local 481, expressed disbelief that Congress could have
intended such a restriction upon labor spending and, while admitting that de minimus non curat lex did not apply in the criminal context, concluded that the money involved was such an
"uncertain, insignificant amount" that it could not be governed
by the statute.
The decision was clearly erroneous from two standpoints.
First, it violated legislative history in an offhanded fashion not
44. 101 F. Supp. 869 (W.D. Mo. 1951).
45. The court accorded an unusual degree of significance to the "nonpartisan" activities of the three employees at the expense of other activities that were undeniably
"partisan" in their effect and intent. One writer noted this fact with the following observation:
Ignoring the extreme distrust of labor unions that motivated the strongest supporters of the restrictive legislation, the court reasoned that Congress could not
have intended to deprive labor organizations of their constitutionally protected
right to engage in political activities. The partisan nature of the activity in
question was camouflaged with glowing language about the altruism of voter
registration. [In fact, voter registration was the most neutral of a variety of
activities, including distribution of campaign literature and operation of a campaign trailer.]
Comment, Of Politics, Pipefitters, and Section 610: Union Political Contributions in
Modern Context, 51 TEx. L. REv. 936, 947 & n.52 (1973) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter
cited as Of Politics].
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of union dues to pay for commercial broadcasts that are designed
to urge the public to elect a certain candidate." 50 Thus, by focusing its attention on the source of the funds as well as the fact that
the communication was intended for the public at large, 51 the
Court gave the statute its first application, but still avoided constitutional issues.
Although the Court in UA W left in doubt the effect of its
decision upon Painters Local 481 and Laborers Local 264, it was
assumed that at least the former had been overruled sub silentio.52 Most of what the decision in UA W gained for the statute was
challenged, however, in United States v. Anchorage Central
Labor Council. 53 There, in a fact situation almost identical to the
earlier case, an association of labor unions had sponsored political
television announcements intended to reach not only union memhers, but also the general public. Tightroping its way through the
UA W rationale, the federal district court distinguished the case
at bar by concluding that the expenditures in question were derived from "voluntary" contributions. In support of this argument, the court noted that the individual local unions had decided by majority vote to contribute funds to the Council for
political purposes. What it failed to recognize was the fact that
the funds came exclusively from general union treasuries. As
scholars quickly perceived, the court's distinction and reasoning
were precarious at best. 54 The court openly admitted that such a
result could "render virtually impossible the enforcement of the
statute. " 55
After UA W and Anchorage, the question of union political
expenditures did not arise in the courts for almost twelve years.
In 1972, however, the controversy came before the Supreme Court
for the third time since the Taft-Hartley Act was passed. In
Pipefitters Local 562 v. United States, 56 the Court examined a
50. 352 U.S. at 586-87.
51. In outlining those inquiries that it felt would be productive in the determination
of what union political expenditures were proscribed by the statute, the Court noted the
following:
[W]as the broadcast paid for out of the general dues of the union membership
or may the funds be fairly said to have been obtained on a voluntary basis? Did
the broadcast reach the public at large or only those affiliated with appellee?
!d. at 592.
52. Of Politics, supra note 45, at 948.
53. 193 F. Supp. 504 (D. Alas. 19t31).
54. An Attempt to Restrict, supra note 33, at 369.
55. 193 F. Supp. at 508.
56. 407 u.s. 385 (1972).
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"Voluntary, Political, Educational, Legislative, Charity and Defense Fund" which had contributed over $150,000 to candidates
for federal office between 1964 and 1966. Both the government
and the union agreed substantially as to the facts. The fund was
controlled and administered by the principal union officer. Although formally separate, the fund and the union were closely
related at all levels. As a consequence, "voluntary" contributions
were employed for political and nonpolitical purposes alike. As to
collection of funds, the union itself conceded that
contributions to the Fund were routinely made at regular intervals at job sites; that they were routinely collected by union
stewards, area foremen, general foremen, or other agents of the
union; that they were determined by a formula based upon the
amount of hours or overtime hours worked upon a job under the
jurisdiction of the union . . . .57

The Court went even further by noting that the members who
made contributions to the fund did so "voluntarily" only "in the
same sense tht they paid their dues or other financial obligations."58
Like his predecessors, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, carefully sidestepped the constitutional questions presented59 and concentrated on defining the scope of section 304.
Shifting emphasis significantly from the two former Supreme
Court decisions, Justice Brennan focused almost exclusively on
two points of interpretation: the separateness of the fund and the
voluntary nature of the contributions. 80 As to the first point, the
Court held that a fund from which political contributions were
drawn must be "separate from the sponsoring union only in the
sense that there must be a strict segregation of its monies from
union dues and assessments. " 81 In addition, administration and
organization of the fund could be financed from the general union
treasury if it was segregated as defined. 82 With respect to the
second point, the Court stated that although all money donations
had to be "voluntary," and any solicitation had to be performed
in such a manner as to clearly indicate "that donations are for a
57. ld. at 392-93 n.3.
58. Jd. at 393.
59. Holding that the lower court's judgment required reversal because of erroneous
jury instructions, Justice Brennan pointed out that such a "disposition makes decision of
the constitutional issues premature, and we therefore do not decide them." ld. at 400.
60. See Of Politics, supra note 45, at 961-62, 970.
61. 407 U.S. at 414 (emphasis added).
62. ld. at 429-30.
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political purpose and that those solicited may decline to contribute without loss of job . . . or any other reprisal within the
union's institutional power," solicitation of funds by union officials was permissible. 63 As Justice Powell quickly pointed out, the
decision not only made possible the collection of contributions
that exhibited the "trappings of voluntariness" while retaining
the "substance of coercion," 64 but it also enabled unions to establish and maintain substantial treasure chests for political activity
with no more concern for distinctness than a "separate ledger and
bank account." 65 The Court's holding neither resolved the confusion as to just where the permissible bounds of union political
expenditures lay, nor did it accomplish even partial resolution of
the constitutional doubts that had grown up around the prohibitions.

C.

Legislative Response

The Pipefitters decision undoubtedly resulted in large measure from a 1972 amendment to section 304 of the Taft-Hartley
Act that was passed as part of the Federal Election Campaign Act
(FECA) 66 while the case was pending before the United States
Supreme Court. As the Court pointed out after reviewing supplemental briefs filed by both parties outlining the effect of the
amendment upon existing law, section 205 of the FECA was little
more than an attempt by Congress to codify prior legislative and
judicial modifications of section 304,67 It appears, however, that
the Court carried the new amendment further than its initial
63. /d. at 414.
64. /d. at 449 (Powell, J., dissenting).
65. /d. at 450 (Powell, J., dissenting).
66. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 10 (amending 18 U .S.C. § 610
(1970)). The amendment added to the section the following pertinent language:
As used in this section, the phrase "contribution or expenditure" shall
include any direct or indirect payment . . . or anything of value . . . to any
candidate, campaign committee, or political party or organization, in connection with any election [governed by this section]; but shall not include communications . . . by a labor organization to its members and their families on any
subject; nonpartisan registration and get-out-the-vote campaigns . . . by a
labor organization aimed at its members and their families; the establishment,
administration, and solicitation of contributions to a separate segregated fund
to be utilized for political purposes by . . . a labor organization: Provided, That
it shall be unlawful for such a fund to make a contribution or expenditure by
utilizing money or anything of value secured by physical force, job discrimination, or financial reprisals; or by dues, fees, or other monies required as a . . .
condition of employment, or by monies obtained in any commercial transaction.
67. 407 U.S. at 399.
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characterization would indicate. Not only did it read the phrase
"separate segregated fund" more narrowly than prior decisions
demanded, 88 but it held that general union treasuries, theoretically sacred against use for political contributions, were fully
available for the establishment, administration, and solicitation
of contributions to a political fund-a use arguably prohibited by
prior law. 89 Some writers viewed the amendment as having transformed section 304 to such an extent that protection against the
corrupting influence of aggregations of wealth, one of the primary
purposes behind the original legislation, was no longer of even
secondary importance, "since the amendment permitted both
unlimited political campaigning directed at members . . . when
funded out of the organizations' general treasuries and unlimited
political campaigning directed at the public if the source of the
funds was voluntary. " 70
As a consequence of this interplay between judicial and legislative interpretation, labor unions appeared to gain an unusual
confidence in their ability to solicit and spend money for political
purposes. In 1973, however, this confidence was answered with a
flurry of federal cases that served as a general reminder that
boundary lines existed even though they were difficult to predict.71
While 1976 produced major amendments to the FECA, 72
these changes have had little more effect upon existing regulation
68. ld. at 421-22.
69. Id. at 429-30; Of Politics, supra note 45, at 967.
70. Comment, The Constitutionality of the Federal Ban on Corporate and Union
Campaign Contributions and Expenditures, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 148, 152 (1974).
In 1974, amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act substantially limited the
amount of expenditures that persons, including labor organizations, could contribute in
federal elections. 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975) (contributions limited to $1000 per
candidate per election). The law carefully exempted from its restrictions, however, any
expenditures that were allowed under the 1972 amendment. 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(2)(B)
(Supp. V 1975). 18 U.S.C. § 608 was repealed by the Act of May 11, 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-283, 90 Stat. 496 (1976).
71. United States v. Boyle, 482 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1076
(1973) ($5,000 of general union funds were loaned to Labor Nonpartisan League to facilitate the funding of a testimonial dinner); Barber v. Gibbons, 367 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mo.·
1973) (a deduction from dues of union members who signed authorization cards was placed
in a special political fund). Cf. Reid v. UAW-AFL-CIO, 479 F.2d 517 (lOth Cir. 1973)
(nonunion workers required to exhaust internal union grievance machinery before judicially contesting the use of agency assessments).
72. The Supeme Court held in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), that while the
contributions provisions of the FECA as amended in 1974 were constitutional, certain
expenditure limitations imposed an unconstitutional burden upon free speech. As a result,
Congress extensively reevaluated its campaign legislation during 1976, proposing substantial changes beyond the scope of this comment.

114

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1977:

of union political spending than to relocate them in a different
title in the Code. 73 At present, the law regarding the status of
labor's financial involvement in the political arena is neither
more predictable nor more easily applied than it was in the beginning. For thirty-three years since the restrictions were originally
enacted in the WLDA, Congress and the courts have done little
more than repeatedly pour new wine into old bottles in competing
attempts to define the parameters of acceptable union political
expenditures.

lli.

FIDELITY TO LEGISLATIVE OBJECTIVES BEHIND REGULATION OF
UNION POLITICAL EXPENDITURES

In C/0, Justice Rutledge outlined the three principal objectives underlying Congress' regulation of union political spending
in terms of "undue influence," "purity of elections," and
"minority protection. " 74 It has been argued that of these objectives both the "undue influence" and "purity of elections" purposes have been forgotten in recent formulations of the law. 75
While it may be true that the legislation has never effectively
accomplished its congressionally defined goals, the wisdom of
such a limited approach to labor political involvement is highly
suspect. The problems are no less compelling now, with or without an intent on the part of Congress to deal with them, than they
were in 1943 when prohibition of labor political spending was
initially codified.

A.

Undue lnfiuence and Purity of Elections

Although official reports are often misleading, and accurate
and exhaustive figures are difficult to come by, it is obvious that
millions of union dollars are spent on campaigns yearly. 76 One
source has estimated approximately $62,000,000 per year as a
likely figure. 77 By any calculation, however, it is generally con73. Although section 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act, as codified in 18 U.S.C. § 610 and
amended by section 205 of the FECA (1972), was repealed by the Act of May 11, 1976, 90
Stat. 496, it reappeared substantially unchanged as part of the Federal Election Campaign
Act, 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b (1976).
74. 335 U.S. at 134-35 (Rutledge, J., concurring). See note 22 and accompanying text
supra.
75. Comment, The Constitutionality of the Federal Ban on Corporate and Union
Campaign Contributions and Expenditures, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 148, 151-52 (1974).
76. See, e.g., Comment, Unions in the Political Arena: Legislative Attempts to Control Union Participation in Politics, 23 Sw. L.J. 713, 714 & n.13 (1969).
77. White, Why Should Labor Leaders Play Politics with the Workers' Money?,
READER's DIG., Oct. 1958, at 158.
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ceded that more union money is spent on federal elections than
is officially acknowledged. 78 Although writers have suggested that
"no real danger to our democratic form of government has been
demonstrated" in this kind of political involvement, 79 such a
claim is neither supported by an examination of the history of
union spending nor consistent with recent federal efforts to police
political campaign financing. It appears, in fact, that unchecked
union financial involvement exhibits an undesirable influence
upon both the politician and the public in general.
In 1940, as Congress was reviewing the problem of corporate
contributions, the issue was clearly framed in the following
words:
We all know that money is the chief source of corruption. We
all know that large contributions to political campaigns . . . put
the political party under obligation to the large contributors,
who demand pay in the way of legislation . . . .80

It appears that the primary reason that Congress extended the
1925 prohibitions against corporate expenditures to include labor
organizations was labor's indiscreet use of money as a club to
insure that Congress voted in a manner consistent with union
objectives, often at the expense of the public interest. 81 In the
78. Kovarsky, Unions and Federal Elections-A Social and Legal Analysis, 12 ST.
LoUis U.L.J. 358, 369 (1968).
79. Comment, Section 304, Taft-Hartley Act: Validity of Restrictions on Union Political Activity, 57 YALE L.J. 806, 821 (1948).
80. 86 CoNo. REc. 2720 (1940).
81. The prohibition against political expenditures which found its way into the
WLDA was neither directly responsive to the emergency that inspired the statute nor
closely related to the other provisions of the bill. In fact, as it originally passed the Senate,
the WLDA contained no prohibition against political expenditures. SeeS. 796, 78th Cong.,
1st Sess., 89 CoNG. REc. 3993-95 (1943). Both of these facts strongly suggest that a more
immediate concern inspired inclusion of the provision. An explanation of Congress' sudden awareness of political spending is probably best understood by reference to a radio
address made by William Green, President of the A.F. of L. In his somewhat tactless
enthusiasm to guarantee that the bill would be defeated, Green issued the following
warning:
The American Federation of Labor calls upon Congress to defeat the [War
Labor Disputes Act].
We will demand a record vote on this measure. Regardless of_whether it is
killed or adopted, we shall endeavor to vote out of office any Member of Congress who supports it. Into this effort the American Federation of Labor will pour
every resource at its command. It may be recalled that some years ago the
American Federation of Labor undertook a similar campaign against the Members of the United States Senate who voted for confirmation to the Supreme
Court of a Federal judge who had upheld "yellow dog" contracts. This appointee
was not confirmed but the American Federation of Labor did not forget those
Senators who voted for him. Within 10 years not a single one of them remained
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words of Congressman Landis, one of the authors of the measure,
[o]ne of the matters upon which I sensed that the public was
taking a stand opposite to that of labor leaders was the question
of handling of funds of labor organizations. The public was
aroused by many rumors of huge war chests being maintained
by labor unions, of enormous fees and dues being extorted from
war workers, of political contributions to parties and candidates
which later were held as clubs over the head of high Federal
officials.
. . .The source of much of the national trouble today in the
coal strike situation is that ill-advised political contribution of
another day [referring, apparently, to the reported contribution
of over $400,000 by the United Mine Workers in the 1936 campaign].82

Similar public displeasure was expressed in 1946, when A. F.
Whitney, President of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen,
threatened that he would spend $47 million to defeat President
Truman in his bid for reelection and $2 1/2 million to defeat any
congressman who exhibited an inclination toward restrictive
labor legislation. 83 The power over "public officials"· that labor
has seemingly purchased is perhaps most sadly evident in the
anxiousness with which prospective recipients have looked after
labor's interests and the extent to which some politicians have
gone to make sure that the right people know they are keeping
the faith. 84 If calculations of labor's "success ratio" are an accuin the United States Senate. We trust that the Members of Congress are cognizant of the fact that the political strength of the American Federation of Labor
has increased many times since then.
89 CoNG. REc. 5226 (1943). After a threat of such dubious propriety, Congress was motivated to add the limitations on union political spending.
82. Hearings on H.R. 804 and H.R. 1483 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm.
on Labor, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 4 (statement ofG.W. Landis, Representative in Congress
from Indiana) (1943).
83. N.Y. Times, May 27, 1946, at 1, col. 6.
84. The problem was illustrated by a commentator as follows:
While labor lobbyists never considered [John F. Kennedy] a tool of labor, as
the author has heard one union lobbyist brutally refer to some congressmen,
Congressman Kennedy's views . . . and the legislative program of the CIO or,
later, the AFL-CIO, were always extremely close .
. . . .During the debate over labor regulation, which resulted in the
Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959, Senator Kennedy was on the phone with George
Meany many days and often late into the night, discussing, arguing, compromising, and most of all reassuring the AFL-CIO head that while bitter defeat was
ahead, presidential aspirant Kennedy had kept the faith and done everything
humanly possible to salvage as good a bill as possible.
Crown, Organized Labor in American Politics: A Look Ahead, N.Y.U. 14TH ANN. CONF.
ON LAB. 261, 263-64 (1961).
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rate indication of its political effectiveness, 85 the efforts of these
political aspirants, while not commendable, are understandable.
The detrimental effects of labor's extensive financial commitment to the political process have been felt as deeply by the
voting public as by the public official. During 1940, Congress
noted this concern in the following language:
[B]ut we also know that large sums of money are used for the
purpose of conducting expensive campaigns through newspapers and over the radio; in the publication of all sorts of literature, true and untrue; and for the purpose of paying the expenses of campaigners sent out into the country to spread propaganda, both true and untrue. 88

Congress' concern appears to be well-founded when one contemplates the volume of what many consider to be "political propaganda"87 that is forced upon an unsuspecting public. 88 This barrage of political persuasion puts the individual voter at almost
impossible odds as he competes to influence the political process.
In addition, it has been suggested that the individual voter may
be deprived of the opportunity to make an informed choice by the
very nature and frequency of biased information that he receives.89 Not only may this deluge of publicity that passes for
unanimity of purpose represent but a bare majority of the labor
constituency, it may, in fact, reflect little more than the personal
political desires of the few who pull the purse strings. 90
A number of arguments have been consistently forwarded by
union supporters in an effort to deny the "undue influence" of
labor's political spending. Perhaps the one most often expressed
is labor's claim that if expenditures on its part are curtailed, the
education and political awareness of the electorate will suffer. In
the words of one union spokesman:
85. See, e.g., Zon, Labor in Politics, 27 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 234, 246, 248 (1962).
86. 86 CoNG. REc. 2720 (1940).
87. E.g., Political Contributions by Labor Unions, supra note 15, at 673-74.
88. In 1944, the CIO's Political Action Committee entered upon a political paper
drive unprecedented in American politics. It appears that 85 million copies of various
campaign literature were produced by the committee in that year, which included 2
million pamphlets, 57 million leaflets, and over 400,000 posters. Barbash, Unions, Government, and Politics, 11Nous. & LAB. REL. REv. 66, 74 (1947). Similarly, the 1945 Report of
the House Special Committee to Investigate Campaign Expenditures noted, with some
concern, the magnitude of union spending for "educational" purposes. See note 26 and
accompanying text supra. Unquestionably, the extent of media and communications exploitation has increased significantly in the last 31 years.
89. See Comment, Freedom from Political Association: The Street and Lathrop
Decisions, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 777, 789 (1962).
90. See Political Contributions by Labor Unions, supra note 15, at 675.
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The prime instrument for making issues the basis of votes is
education. The continuing work of the labor movement in educating members, family and the public to study issues, make up
their minds on issues, and cast a vote for issues is building a
broad base of principle for American politics. No other organized force in American life carries on this political missionary
work . . . instilling the ideal of casting a ballot for a set of
ideas. 91

It is doubtful whether, in practice, organized labor's motives are
quite so altruistic or its accomplishments quite so pure. In truth,
labor's goal is practical-winning support for union advancement-and its approach "propagandistic. " 92 Union claims appear
to give too little credit to the American public and too much
credit to itself.
A second argument, which, according to unionists, militates
against any concern regarding the undue influence of union
money upon the electoral process, was fervently asserted by the
director for the Department of Politics, Education, and Training
of the ILGUW as follows:
To provide some financial counterweight to the generally conservative position of the money lords is vital to a democrary.
And it is the labor movement that, in recent years, has moved
toward supplying some, even if not enough, financial counterbalance to the voice of our monied aristocracy in elections. 93

Put in somewhat less sensational terms, unions supposedly supply the financial counterweight to corporate political spending
that is seen as· conservative and therefore opposed to the general
thrust of the labor movement.
This characterization of labor's purpose in the political arena
appears inaccurate in light of closer observations. In the first
place, while it is true that unions and corporations operate in the
same general sphere, courts and scholars alike have long recognized that basic differences in their inherent nature and formulation suggest that each should be considered separately in terms
of the problems of undue influence. 94 Secondly, as the law is pres91. Tyler, The Role of Trade Unions in a Democratic Society, N.Y.U. 14TH ANN.
LAB. 277, 279-80 (1961).
92. Stein, Trade Unions in a Democracy: A Comment, N.Y.U. 14TH ANN. CoNF. ON
LAB. 289, 293 (1961).
93. Tyler, supra note 91, at 280.
94. As one author noted:
But lumping unions and corporations together . . . may not result in equality
between them because of differences in structure, wealth, membership, [etc.].
CONF. ON
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ently structured, any regulation of union expenditures would
apply equally to corporate spending. 95 Finally, while labor repeatedly cites corporate spending as money without balance, 96 it must
hesitantly admit that corporate expenditures have generally been
self-balancing, being split almost equally between Democratic
and Republican candidates. 97 In contrast, labor money was spent
almost exclusively for Democratic candidates. So secure, in fact,
has the marriage between labor and Democrats become, that unions have come to be viewed as "a dependable part of the Democratic political apparatus." 98
Certain scholars have expressed the opinion that the major
obstacle in the way of labor's attempt to achieve its full political
potential is the "taint of corruption" that encumbers its public
image. 99 While stories circulate about "under-the-table deals"
between unions and politicians, 100 labor is often hard pressed to
satisfactorily counteract all accusations. In a partial attempt to
justify this public image, if not completely eradicate it, a certain
high-ranking unionist offered the following rationalization:
This means that union political action is, in methodology,
closely akin to practical political action. The practical politician
. . . [D]istinctions should be made between corporations and unions. There
are, for example, differences in structure, history, and legal context of the decision making process, especially concerning minority members; in the type of
interest of union members and investors due to differences in purpose and function; in the potential size of political contributions and expenditure; and in the
scope of federal and state regulation. These and other distinctions may warrant
different legislative treatment of corporations and unions. They certainly suggest that each organization should be considered separately in connection with
the problems of undue influence and minority protection.
British and American Experience, supra note 24, at 387; accord, United States v. CIO,
335 U.S. 106, 154 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
95. Regulation of union political spending, as originally enacted, was nothing more
than a wholesale application of corporate restrictions to the labor context. This close
joinder of corporate and union interests has continued throughout the evolution of the
regulatory scheme and is contained in the present§ 441b provisions. The only difference
in treatment appears in the first sentence of§ 441b, where corporations "organized by the
authority of any law of Congress" are prevented from expending money in connection with
any election or primary. Labor organizations and all other corporations, on the other hand,
are restricted only with respect to federal elections and primaries. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b (a)
(1976).
96. Tyler, supra note 91, at 280.
97. See British and American Experience, supra note 24, at 386 n.106.
98. Crown, supra note 84, at 263. See id. at 261-62, 267; Masters, The Organized
Labor Bureaucracy as a Base of Support for the Democratic Party, 27 LAw & CoNTEMP.
PROB. 252 (1962).
99. Crown, supra note 84, at 274-75.
100. See id. at 267.
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must win elections . . . . The practical politician must reach for
power, however limited, unlike the political scientist who can
prove the inevitably corrosive influence of power in human
hands.
Because labor must move realistically in an immoral civilization, the methodology of labor . . . is necessarily molded by
the imperatives, often distasteful, of our hypocritical culture. 101

If for no other reason, such an approach to the political arena
clearly requires both watchful concern and careful regulation.
The undue influence of monied labor interests, at least in the
public eye, is further manifested by the use of labor financial
support in predominantly rural, agricultural, and nonindustrial
states. The extent to which national union money has been channeled into various "outside" states, particularly western, is illustrated by the 1956 congressional campaigns when Democratic
candidates for both the Senate and the House received "national
labor gifts" in almost every state in the nation. 102 The conflict of
interest that voters justifiably fear will be created by this largescale political involvement outside labor's immediate areas of
concern is demonstrated by the recent emphasis in many campaigns upon the opposition's "domination by the monied interests from the East. " 103 While a Congressman favorable to labor is
a union asset, whether elected in Idaho or Michigan, the nonindustrial electorate is understandably concerned that their duly
elected representatives will be more responsive to the hand that
held the check than to the hand that cast the ballot.
In light of such troublesome symptoms, 104 the Supreme
Court's approach to the problem of undue influence in Pipefitters
was unique. Noting Congress' dual objectives in passing the law,
i.e., minority protection and the elimination of disproportionate
influence, Justice Brennan explained on behalf of the Court that
"the aggregate wealth [that Congress] plainly had in mind was
the general union treasury-not the funds donated by union
members of their own free and knowing choice." 105 It appears from
this analysis that Justice Brennan confused the two separate purposes, and, by compounding them into one objective, imposed the
vehicle for minority protection as a limitation upon the process
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Tyler, supra note 91, at 287.
Masters, supra note 98, at 257.
!d.
See notes 99-103 and accompanying text supra.
407 u.s. 385, 416 (1972).
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of insuring against undue influence. In any event, as the United
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit explained a year
later, because of the Pipefitters decision, "unions may now contribute any amount so long as it is from a proper source." 106 Dissenting from the majority decision in Pipefitters, Justice Powell,
joined by Chief Justice Burger, expressed firm disagreement with
the majority's interpretation:
The decision of the Court today will have a profound effect
upon the role of labor unions and corporations in the political
life of this country. The holding, reversing a trend since 1907,
opens the way for major participation in politics by the largest
aggregations of economic power, the great unions and corporations.107

From CIO to Pipefitters, the courts have continualy restricted the scope of legislation regulating the use of union money
in politics. The law, as presently construed, affords little protection against any undue influence that labor might have. If, as
Congress originally contended, labor's influence is a legitimate
legislative concern, the consistent failure of existing federal prohibitions to remedy the situation indicates a critical need for more
rigorous and comprehensive means of control.

B.

Minority Protection

Most scholars agree that the strongest argument in favor of
federal regulation of union political expenditures is that of minority protection. 108 The thrust of the minority protection argument
was outlined in United States v. Boyle:
[A] second purpose of [section 304 is] to assure that a dissenting union member is not forced to contribute, in the form of
mandatory dues and assessments, to support political views
with which he disagrees.
. . . By definition the protection of minority interests requires that the majority be restrained in exercising its will over
the minority. If a union could expend "involuntary" funds upon
the vote of a majority of its members, minority interests would
not be protected-they would be rendered irrelevant. 109
106. United States v. Boyle, 482 F.2d 755, 763 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1076
(1973).
107. 407 U.S. at 442-43 (Powell, J., dissenting).
108. See, e.g., Ruark, Labor's Political Spending and Free Speech, 53 Nw. U.L. REv.
61, 77 (1958).
109. 482 F.2d 755, 763 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1076 (1973).
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In an effort to mitigate the initial appeal of this rationale,
union supporters have fashioned a number of contrary arguments. Foremost among these is the claim that since "unions are
more homogeneous" than most organizations as well as the country as a whole, protection of dissenters' rights naturally plays a
less significant role in the government of union affairsY 0 While
the contention is questionable even if its premise were assumed
to be accurate, closer examination demonstrates conclusively
that the homegeneity of union political sentiment and membership is a proposition that will not stand. Union officials themselves have found it necessary to admit that primary among the
factors that have presented serious obstacles in the way of
planned political action is "lack of political solidarity among
union members." 111 Surveys polling rank-and-file union membership clearly substantiate this observation. One survey conducted
among the unions in St. Louis, Missouri, showed that in response
to the question "should the union advise members how to vote,"
62.2 percent of the union membership answered "no." 112 The
same survey showed only a slight majority of the membership in
agreement with the idea of having the union collect a dollar from
each member in order to support friendly candidates. In a second
survey, "over half the members (57 percent) state[d] that they
should neither be told whom to vote for by the union nor be asked
for voluntary donations to finance union political action." 113
Thus, the idea that union membership is politically homogeneous
and, therefore, less susceptible to problems concerning dissenters'
rights is little more than a well conceived fiction. As the author
of one survey concludes, "[t]he rank and file is split right down
the middle about whether or not the union should be active in
politics at all." 114
Recognizing that a substantial minority interest exists, union
supporters have resorted to an alternative argument appealing to
the "democratic" processes within the union and the maxim of
majority rule. The argument claims that since the hallmark of
democratic government is rule by the majority, and since it is the
recognized course of all organizations that a minority of its members must at times endure actions against its wishes and, further,
110.
111.
112.
113.

See Tyler, supra note 91, at 284.
Chang, supra note 6, at 554.
/d. at 557 n.19.
Hudson & Rosen, Union Political Actions: The Member Speaks, 7 INDUS. & LAB.

REL. REV. 404, 410 (1954).
114. Id. at 408.
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since dissenters have ample opportunity before the fact to actively participate in determining organizational policies, minority union members are left without grounds for complaint when
the majority takes action contrary to their desires. 115 As one writer
sums up the argument, "[t]he injury to the dissenters is so
minor, . . . when compared with the benefits to the majority,
that the promotion of a minor indignancy to a constitutional
wrong would be injudicious. " 118
When one looks closely at the forms of union democracy,
however, the unionist position becomes immediately suspect. In
the first place, labor itself admits that the unique "institutional
qualities" peculiar to unions fashion a mode of democracy that
is neither related nor readily comparable to the models that characterize the nation as a whole. 117 Union democracy seldom if ever
takes the form of organized elections to determine which candidates or political programs union money will support. More accurately, the process is one of official discretion and member
conversion-labor hierarchy spending member contributions in
an effort to convince union membership of the quality of chosen
candidates. Furthermore, it seems that majority rule as an institutional philosophy is properly applied only in the context of
organizations whose membership is voluntary.U 8 The pervasiveness in our society of union security agreements in the form of
union shop and agency shop contracts makes its application to
labor organizations dubious. If majority rule has any place at all
in the union context, it should be restricted to activities for which
unions were organized and not allowed beyond that realm. As one
author puts it, "[m]en join unions to increase their bargaining
power with management, not to increase their political power
through a pooling of money to back political candidates. " 119
A third argument that labor expounds in refutation of the
minority protection concern is that the actions and political ide115. See Woll, Unions in Politics: A Study in Law and the Workers' Needs, 34 S.
CALIF. L. REv. 130, 141 (1961). The judiciary has occasionally shown sympathy for this
argument. See Interntional Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 808 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 148 (1948) (Rutledge, J.,
concurring).
116. Comment, The Compelled Contribution in the Integrated Bar and the All Union
Shop, 1962 Wis. L. REv. 138, 149 (1962).
117. Tyler, supra note 91, at 285.
118. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 789 (1961) (Black, J .,
dissenting).
119. An Attempt to Restrict, supra note 33, at 370. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 777-78 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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ologies of an organization are not necessarily meant to reflect the
views of all of its members; thus, whatever the organization's
position, membership is free to dissent and register its support for
candidates and issues of its own choosing. 120 Unfortunately, this
argument ignores one basic issue. The question is not whether a
union member will be free to support his own political ideologies,
but whether he will be free to refrain from supporting policies and
candidates he opposes. Moreover, the history of internal union
discipline is not as supportive of the contention that individual
members are at liberty to dissent as unionists might wish. A
classic example is Mitchell & Mulgrew v. International Association of Machinists, 121 where a California court upheld the expulsion by a union of three longtime members for "conduct unbecoming a member." The conduct so repulsive to the union was
active campaigning for a "right to work" law which the union
enthusiastically opposed. The impact of this kind of punitive
action is particularly troublesome when viewed in terms of the
general acceptance and governmental approval of agency shop
and union shop agreements. Where union membership is made a
condition of employment-such that, contrary to a worker's
wishes, he must join or at least financially support a union-to
say that the individual is free actively to support his own candidate may merely offer an alternative without substance.
It is ironic that unions, which came to power by championing
the cause of individual freedom, now provide a new arena for the
conflict beween the interests of the individual and those of aggregate power. 122 On the one hand, union interest in self-preservation
encourages explicit political action that demands the use of union
money. On the other hand, the individual member is often motivated by more personal concerns, such as race, religion, or personal preference, which may oppose the political orientation of
his union. When these different stances collide, labor would have
its members believe that the union perception of the common
good must be more correct because it is "democratic" and be120. Woll, Unions in Politics: A Study in Law and the Workers' Needs, 34 S. CALIF.
L. REV. 130, 151 (1961).
121. No. 730083 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 1960) cited in Note, Political Free Speech for
the Union Man, 11 W. REs. L. REV. 661, 662-63 (1960). See also DeMille v. American Fed'n
of Radio Artists, 187 P.2d 769 (1947) (Cecil B. DeMille lost union membership and a
$98,000-a-year job because he opposed the union's one dollar per member assessment to
prevent passage of a California "right to work" law).
122. See Note, Political Free Speech for the Union Man, 11 W. REs. L. REv. 661
(1960).
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cause labor's enemy cannot be the worker's friend. The concern
of one political scholar seems appropriate as he writes:
Until general economic ethics change, unions could do
nothing better than to post on every local's wall the warning of
Oswald Spengler:
In the beginning the leadership and the apparatus come
into existence for the sake of the program. Then they are
held on to defensively by the incumbents for the sake of
power and booty . . . . Lastly the program vanishes
from memory and the organization works for its own
sake alone. 123

IV.

A.

A SUGGESTED APPROACH

Basic Policies and New Legislation

Congress' struggle with the problems of union political
spending has been frustrating and long. The result is a law the
interpretation of which is uncertain, and the effect of which is
questionable. Moreover, it appears that judicial interpretation
has eliminated "undue influence" and "purity of elections" as
workable objectives of campaign finance regulation. Whether this
is the result of a developing attitude that unions and politics have
moved beyond the need for such restrictions or merely the gradual
effect of continual labor pressure and involvement is immaterial.
It remains unlikely that more relevant objectives than those originally espoused can be invented from which to fashion meaningful
regulation.
Courts and congressmen alike presently admit that minority
protection is a major justification for limiting labor spending in
politics. Section 441b, the latest codification of the law regulating
union political spending, attempts to deal with this problem in
two ways: (1) by providing that all member contributions be
made to a "separate segegated" fund, and (2) by mandating that
all such contributions be made knowingly and voluntarily. 124
Although the wording of the statute appears to offer an encouraging thrust, much of its positive power has been sapped
through recent judicial definition. In Pipefitters, the Supreme
Court made three crucial observations. First, it construed the
words "separate" and "segregated" as being synonomous, holding that political funds needed to be separate from the sponsoring
123. Crown, supra note 84, at 276.
124. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b (b)(2)-(3)(A) (1976).
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union only in the sense that the money had to be distinct from
dues and assessments. 125 Second, the Court stated that while such
a fund could not expend money from the general union treasury
for political purposes, it could be established, administered, and
maintained from such money. 128 Finally, concerning voluntariness, the Court concluded that contributions to a segregated fund
had to be "knowing, free-choice donations." It added, however,
that those donations could be actively solicited by union officials,
the determinative factor being whether the individual member
was informed that he was free to refuse his support. 127
The Court's rendition of the statute created significant deficiencies in all three areas of its definition. First, while the statute
by its language prohibited the threat or use of force, discrimination, or reprisals in obtaining contributions,t 28 the Court's interpretation prevented the statute from recognizing the more subtle
coercion that was all too prevalent in the Pipefitters case. In spite
of assertions on the part of the Pipefitters union officials that all
donations were "voluntary," members' contributions were, as the
Court itself recognized, voluntary only in the "same sense that
[members] paid their dues or other financial obligations." 129
Quoting with approval from the lower court, Justice Brennan
conceded that "[i]t would appear to be unrealistic to believe
that such a large number of workmen would make such substantial voluntary contributions to be used for political purposes unless they felt that their job security required them to do so." 130
The_ fact that such circumstances would satisfy the letter of the
law offers perhaps the most conclusive evidence of its weakness.
Thus, from the standpoint of minority protection, and in
order to insure that political donations are not only knowingly
made, but are voluntaey in a sense broader than the fact that an
authorization card defines them to be so, the law regulating political spending demands revision. It appears that the only certain
way to guarantee protection to dissenting union members is to
remove the crucial factor of identity from the donation process by
making member contributions anonymous. Anonymity might be
accomplished in a number of ways. One possible means would be
125. 407 u.s. 385, 414, 421-22 (1972).
126. ld. at 429-30.
127. Id. at 414, 415.
128. Federal Election Campaign Act§ 205, 86 Stat. 10 (1972).
129. 407 U.S. at 393.
130. 407 U.S. at 393 n.4. For a discussion of the British experience with similar
problems, see British and American Experience, supra note 24, at 383.
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through the use of prepared donation envelopes and designated
collection boxes. This would permit vigorous solicitation, even by
union officials, while maintaining personal security for union
membership. Undoubtedly, union supporters will complain that
such a procedure would severely limit available funds. This lament, however, argues more for the claim that the present system
produces coerced donations than it does for the preservation of
that system.
The second weakness created by the Court's reading in
Pipefitters of the statutory prohibitions on union spending is that
while general union dues money cannot itself be expended for
political purposes (thus, protecting minority members who opposed ideologies which those funds would support), it can be
utilized to establish and administer the fund that finances political activity. In light of the policy against mandatory political
support, it is a distinction without a difference to protect a union
member against forced financial backing of a political candidate
and at the same time require him to maintain the organization
that will finance that candidate. The most plausible alternative
would be to require a political fund to originate and maintain
itself from the source of its money, namely, "voluntary" contributions.
The third weakness infused into the statute by Pipefitters
resulted from the Court's narrow reading of the phrase "separate
segregated fund." Justice Brennan, without justifying his preference for a more restrictive reading, was generous enough to concede that the words "separate" and "segregated," as used by the
legislature in defining the restrictions on union spending,
normally would not be read as synonomous, and that their combined use normally would mean "an apartness beyond segregated. " 131 Since Congress admittedly was seeking to further the
objective of minority protection, the normal reading appears to
offer the better alternative. Not only would the danger of commingling and misuse of funds, inadvertent as well as willful, be
less likely under the application of a broader definition, ·but the
unhealthy domination and control by interested union officials of
this kind of "segregated" fund could be avoided with more certainty. By requiring the fund to be separated from the union, both
as to money and personnel, and by forbidding salaries and ex penses to be drawn from union treasuries, the ideal of minority protection could be more realistically served.
131. 407 U.S. at 421-22.
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Although undue influence and purity of elections have arguably been eliminated as viable objectives of existing regulation of
labor political expenditures, it would be naive, particularly in
view of present legislative efforts to police campaign financing, to
assume that lawmakers have forgotten the significance of such
concerns. Numerous suggestions have been made by scholars as
to the best way to incorporate these objectives into new legislation regulating union spending. 132 Of these suggestions, a dollar
limitation on allowable labor spending appears to be the most
. direct and effective means to achieve the desired purpose. Earlier
attempts in this vein have been unsuccessful, but their failure
derived more from flabby draftsmanship than inherent weakness.
To insure that prior failures are not repeated, two supplementary
points of focus might be useful. First, Congress should establish
a dollar limitation on the amount of "segregated" union money
that politicians and party campaign committees may accept. 133
Second, Congress should restrict the dollar amount of
"expenditures" that segregated union campaign funds would be
allowed to make. 134
132. E.g., Chang, supra note 6, at 572; Ruark, Labor's Political Spending and Free
Speech, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 61, 76-77 (1958); Comment, Restraints on Labor and Corporate
Expenditures in Federal Elections, 24 Mo. L. REv. 528, 537 (1959); Comment, Unions in
the Political Arena: Legislative Attempts to Control Union Participation in Politics, 23
Sw. L.J. 713, 723-25, 726-27 (1969); Political Contributions by Labor Unions, supra note
15, at 673.
133. Such a restriction was explicitly declared constitutional in Buckley v. Valeo, 424
u.s. 1, 25 (1976).
134. The suggestion that a ceiling be placed upon dollar "expenditures" as well as
"contributions" immediately faces two significant obstacles. First, the legislature must
carefully draft any such limitation to avoid a loophole similar to that which unions exploited in the early 1940's in order to escape the $5000 Hatch Act restrictions. See notes
18-19 and accompanying text su~ra. In this regard, Congress must take care to insure that
expenditure limitations are not nullified through fractionalization of segregated union
political funds into numerous organizations, each expending the allotted amount. Likewise, Congress must avoid the use of local labor organizations which might circumvent
the effect of expenditure limitations that would otherwise apply if fewer national or regional organizations controlled the distribution of money.
A second, and certainly more substantial, obstacle to expenditure limitations is posed
by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In
that case, the Court upheld contribution restrictions imposed by the 1974 amendments
to the Federal Election Campaign Act, but declared that limitations on political expenditures amounted to an unconstitutional burden upon free speech. The Court's distinction
between contributions and expenditures was questioned by Justice White in a separate
opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, as he urged that the expenditure
limitation be upheld:
In sustaining the contribution limits, the Court recognizes the importance
of avoiding public misapprehension about a candidate's reliance on large contributions. It ignores that consideration in invalidating [the expenditure limita-
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Constitutionality

Since the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act, constitutionality has been a nagging sore for advocates of restrictive legislations]. In like fashion, it says that Congress was entitled to determine that the
criminal provisions against bribery and corruption, together with the disclosure
provisions, would not in themselves be adequate to combat the evil and that
limits on contributions should be provided. Here, the Court rejects the identical
kind of judgment made by Congress as to the need for and utility of expenditure
limits.
424 U.S. at 262. Justice White's hypothetical concerning two brothers, each with a million
dollars to spend, one of whom contributes money, while the other expends it, clearly
illustrates the basic concern. Scholars, likewise, have been ill at ease with the Court's
decision. This disapproval was appropriately articulated by one writer in the following
words:
White felt the expenditure limits should be upheld because the purposes served
were legitimate and substantial. First, the expenditure ceilings reinforce the
contribution limits. With the rising costs of campaigns, the pressure to raise
funds will constantly build. This tempts the candidate to resort to those
individuals having large sums of money who are sufficiently confident of not
being caught to risk flouting the contribution limits. The regulations saved the
candidate from this dilemma by imposing a reasonable ceiling on all candidates.
Second, the expenditure limits have their own potential for preventing the corruption of federal elections: 'There are many illegal ways of spending money to
influence elections. One would be blind to history to deny that unlimited money
tempts people to spend it on whatever money can buy to influence an election
. . . . [T]he expenditure limits could play a substantial role in preventing
unethical practices. There just wouldn't be enough of "that kind of money" to
go around.' Third, the expenditure limits would ease the candidates' obsession
with fund-raising, thereby freeing them and their staffs to communicate in more
places and ways unconnected with the fund-raising function. Fourth, the ceilings would help restore and maintain public confidence in federal elections; it
is critical to dispel the impression that federal elections are purely and simply
a function of money. Justice Whie concluded by saying that because the ceilings
were not too low, the limitations would ensure that the election could not tum
on the difference in the amounts of money candidates have to spend. He expressed his alarm that '[t]he [Court's] holding perhaps is not that federal
candidates have the constitutional right to purchase their election, but many
will so interpret the Court's conclusion in this case.' . . . Justice White's arguments are persuasive. As the cases concerning corporations, unions . . . demonstrate, the Court has historically been concerned with the corrosive effect which
unregulated spending has on the integrity of the electoral process and the public's faith in it.
Comment, The Constitutionality of Limitations on Individual Political Campaign Contributions and Expenditures: The Supreme Court's Decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 25 EMORY
L.J. 400, 439-40 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
It is possible, although uncertain, that the Buckley decision comprises a less impressive obstacle to expenditure limitations than one would at first suppose. In upholding the
contribution restrictions in that case, the Court declared that such a limitation "entails
only a marginal restriction on the contributor's ability to engage in free communication."
424 U.S. at 20. In light of this language, a somewhat less severe restriction on expenditures
than the $1000 limitation might pass as a "marginal restriction on the contributor's
ability."
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tive governing the political use of labor money. For nearly thirty
years, the Supreme Court has deftly avoided speaking directly to
this issue. Instead, it has teased and intimidated Congress and
the Justice Department with "grave doubts" and stirring dissents
denouncing regulation to the point that no one is certain what the
status of the law actually is. Thus, although regulation of union
political involvement has never authoritatively been declared
unconstitutional, it is clear that any new legislatio'n must necessarily contend with the specter of that possibility.
The constitutionality of Congress' power to regulate the use
of money in the political arena was established as early as 1916
in the case of United States v. United States Brewers' Ass'n. 135
The constitutional basis justifying such regulation was twopronged: (1) the clause in article I, section 4 that permits Congress to control "the Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections," and (2) the "necessary and proper" clause of article I,
section 8, which allows the legislature broad power in preserving
the purity of the political process. The Supreme Court sanctioned
the application of this power to labor political spending in the
CIO case:
There can be little doubt of Congress' power to regulate the
making of political contributions and expenditures by labor unions, as well as by other organizations and individuals, in the
interest of free and pure elections and the prevention of official
corruption . . . .138

Congressional power in this regard, as in every other, however, is
not absolute. As political theorists have been quick to point out,
any federal regulation that invades the realm of political expression necessarily must be weighed against the importance of first
amendment rights. 137 •
Just as congressional power is not absolute, neither are the
constitutional freedoms against which legislative action is measured. Political theorists likewise have consistently expressed the
opinion that
"freedom [of speech and press] does not deprive a state of the
primary and essential right of self-preservation, which, so long
135. 239 F. 163 (W.D. Pa. 1916).
136. 335 U.S. 106, 139 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
137. E.g., Goodman & Thomason, Prohibition of Expenditures by Labor Unions in
Connection with Federal Elections, 21 GA. B.J. 575, 579-80 (1959); Comment, Restraints
on Labor and Corporate Expenditures in Federal Elections, 24 Mo. L. REV. 528,533 (1959).
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as human governments endure, they cannot be denied." Preservation of the electoral process would . . . appear essential to the
preservation of our form of government. 138

The issue, therefore, is not so much whether a particular enactment of campaign finance regulation affects the enjoyment of
first amendment rights, but whether it constitutes an infringement severe enough to warrant a remedy. The courts have developed two closely related standards in order to define the permissible limits beyond which invasion by Congress of first amendment
guarantees cannot go. The first requires that before first amendment freedoms may be infringed, a "clear and present danger"
must exist, threatening substantive evils that the government is
empowered to prevent.t 39 The second similarly demands a
"compelling state interest" that necessitates the abridging legislation.140 In terms of undue influence, the judiciary and the legislature have long recognized the inherent threat to the integrity of
democratic government associated with accumulated wealth.
The fears expressed have not been disproven in practice. Labor
unions as well as other powerful interest groups have produced
such a disproportionate effect upon the political arena and so
jeopardized the integrity of the system that extensive energy has
been expended in the lawmaking bodies to develop workable laws
restricting their activity. As Justice Powell so aptly noted in his
Pipefitters dissent, unnecessary restrictions upon congressional
efforts to prevent undue influence and preserve the purity of elections are occurring "at a time paradoxically when public and
legisltive interest has focused on limiting-rather than enlarging-the influence upon the elective process of concentrations of
wealth and power ._" 141
The need for minority protection offers perhaps the most
compelling reason for federal regulation of organized labor political spending. Undoubtedly, this derives partially from the nature
of the interest involved. That is, the conflict concerns the balancing not of a public interest against a constitutional right but of
the first amendment rights of an individual against those of an
institution. Although the question of whether or not first amendment rights apply to institutions, and if so to what extent, has
138. Goodman & Thomason, Prohibition of Expenditures by Labor Unions in
Connection with Federal Elections, 21 GA. B.J. 575, 580 (1959).
139. Originally stated in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
140. United States v. Pipefitters Local562, 434 F.2d 1116, 1123 (8th Cir. 1970), rev'd,
407 u.s. 385 (1972).
141. 407 U.S. 385, 443 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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never been conclusively answered, 142 there can be little argument
that, as between institutions and individuals, the lat,ter enjoy a
preferred status. Moreover, in the realm of labor political involvement, it appears that the conflict is not between the organization's right of free speech and the individual's same right as much
as it is between convenience to the union in communicating political preferences and the right of the member to refrain from supporting repugnant ideologies. After all, the union can still voice
its opinion loudly. It must do so, however, without the money of
dissenting members. In any event, the courts have registered an
influential vote confirming the compelling interests that underlie
the regulation of spending to insure minority protection. In its
consideration of the Pipefitters case, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit articulated its vote as follows:
Congress in passing [Section 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act] was
attempting to protect the individual union member's right to his
own political views and the right to support or not to support
them through money contributions. In light of the substantial
interest each individual has in his own political activities, it
follows that Congress in passing the legislation was responding
to a compelling interest. 143

V.

CONCLUSION

Existing legislative restrictions upon the financial involvement of labor organizations in the political arena have suffered
extensively from the eroding elements of judicial interpretation,
union exploitation, and legislative repair. As presently constituted, the law offers an explicit example of the consequences that
follow from placing "new wine into old bottles" -neither is the
wine enhanced nor are the bottles preserved. If the problems of
union political involvement are to be resolved in understandable
and effective terms, lawmakers need to clear the table and begin
a fresh legislative structure upon the foundational objectives of
preventing undue influence, preserving the purity of elections,
and protecting the interests of the political minority.
142. See, e.g., Goodman & Thomason, Prohibition of Expenditures by Labor Unions
in Connection with Federal Elections, 21 GA. B.J. 575, 577-78 (1959); Kovarsky, Unions
and Federal Elections-A Social and Legal Analysis, 12 ST. LoUis U.L.J. 358, 374 (1968);
Ruark, Labor's Political Spending and Free Speech, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 61, 73-74 (1958);
Comment, Section 304, Taft-Hartley Act: Validity of Restrictions on Union Political
Activity, 57 YALE L.J. 806, 816 (1948).
143. 434 F.2d 1116, 1123 (8th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 407 U.S. 385 (1972). See International
Association of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 777-78 (Douglas, J., concurring), 78384 (Black, J., dissenting), 788-89 (Black, J., dissenting) (1961).

